学　术

　　题　目：Competition and Quality Improvement Under Asymmetric Information

　　讲座人：Bo Chen（陈波）博士

　　主持人：经济与管理学院　倪得兵教授

　　时　间：2016年7月4号（星期一）10：30-12:00

　　地　点：经管楼A101

　　内容摘要：

　　It has been a widely accepted tenet that prices can often serve as credible signals of a firm's product quality. We consider a price competition game where two firms signal their product quality levels through prices and the firms' private product quality levels are endogenously determined. In the competition game, each firm first chooses an investment level which stochastically determines the firm's product quality. Each firm privately observes its quality and then competes with its rival to serve a market with vertically differentiated consumers. We find that unlike a monopoly, the firms have positive incentives to invest so as to improve their product quality. Our results hence identify an additional channel of inefficiency for monopoly on incentives to improve quality compared to an oligopoly setting.

　　讲座人简介：

　　Bo Chen（陈波），美国Southern Methodist University经济系副教授（Tenured），威斯康辛大学（Madison）经济学博士，在《 American Economic Review 》、《Journal of Economic Theory》、《Games and Economic Behavior》、《Management Science》、《International Journal of Game Theory》和《Journal of Mathematical Economics》等刊物上发表论文近20篇。

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