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学者论坛: Service Pricing with Loss Averse Customers & Fee-for-Service vs Bundled Payment: An Analysis from Aspects of Congestion and Service Quality
文:教师发展中心 来源:党委教师工作部、人力资源部(教师发展中心) 时间:2016-06-03 7238

  人力资源部教师发展中心开展“学者论坛”系列学术活动,定期邀请与我校教师研究领域相关的知名学者,以专题报告的形式与师生分享和研讨最新研究动态和成果,旨在为教师提供学术探讨和交流的平台,开拓教师学术视野。现将第22期论坛安排如下,欢迎广大师生参加。

  一、主讲人:香港理工大学商学院 Yulan Wang副教授

  二、地点:经管楼C103(EMBA教室)

  三、论坛安排

  1、报告一:

  (1)主题:Service Pricing with Loss Averse Customers

  (2)时间:2016年6月7日(周二)上午10:15

  (3)内容简介:

  We consider a queueing system in which customers are loss averse towards both price and delay attributes: customers compare these two attributes to their rational expectations of the outcomes, with losses being more painful than equal-sized gains being pleasant. We first study customers' equilibrium queueing strategies. We find that, in contrast to the traditional case in which loss aversion is not considered, there could exist three equilibrium strategies, among which one is is preferred in the sense that customers’ utility is highest atthis equilibrium. We then study the optimal pricing problem for a monopoly server. We show that loss aversion polarizes queues, making long queues even longer and short queues even shorter. Furthermore, loss aversion towards the delay attribute drives down the optimal price whereas loss aversion towards the price attribute pushes up the optimal price. We also find that profit- and welfare-maximizing prices are not the same in a monopoly market. Finally, we consider pricing competition in a duopoly market and find that the conclusions depend on the capacity relative to the market size. Interestingly, with loss-averse customers, a firm can obtain a higher profit in a duopoly market than that in a monopoly market.

  2、报告二:

  (1)主题:Fee-for-Service vs Bundled Payment: An Analysis from Aspects of Congestion and Service Quality

  (2)时间:2016年6月8日(周三)上午10:15

  (3)内容简介:

  To contain healthcare cost and improve quality, there is an on-going debate regarding the impact of different reimbursement schemes on patient welfare.  In this paper, we examinetwo commonly used reimbursement schemes: (1) a Fee-For-Service (FFS) reimbursement scheme under which health care providers (HCPs) are paid for each service they provide; and (2) a Bundled Payment (BP) reimbursement scheme under which the HCP receives a lump sum payment for an entire episode of care (regardless of how many times a patient is readmitted to the system).  To examine the interplays among the patients' ``endogenous'' decision about whether or not to seek treatment from a designated HCP, the HCP's service rate decision, and the funder's reimbursement payment decision under the FFS and BP schemes, we present a model by using an M/M/1 queue with Bernoulli feedback to capture the patients' readmission process.  We determine the equilibrium outcomes (the patients' endogenous arrival rate, the HCP's service rate, and the funder's reimbursement under both the FFS and BP schemes). We find that, in general, the BP scheme improves the patient welfare and service quality (i.e., a lower readmission rate) but the FFS scheme results in a shorter waiting time.  However, when the funder's budget is large and the patient population is medium, both schemes are equally efficient in terms of all performance metrics including the patient welfare, service quality, the waiting time per visit and the total waiting time.  

  四、主讲人简介:

  Yulan Wang博士现为香港理工大学商学院物流及海事学系副教授;本科和硕士毕业于上海交通大学,博士毕业于杜克大学。她的研究兴趣包括:供应链外包、博弈论在制造和服务的应用、供应链设计和协调,以及运营管理中的行为分析等。研究成果发表于国际顶级和主流学术期刊如:Management Science, Operations Research, Production and Operations Management, Naval Research Logistics, European Journal of Operational Research等。她还担任了Omega 副主编、Decision Sciences 和 Journal of the Operational Research Society客座主编等学术兼职。

  五、主办单位:人力资源部教师发展中心

  六、承办单位:经济与管理学院

                 

                 人力资源部教师发展中心

                   2016年6月3日


编辑:罗莎  / 审核:罗莎  / 发布:罗莎